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Summary 
Current and future aviation safety trends related to the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration (NASA) Atmospheric Environment Safety Technologies (AEST) Project’s three technical 
challenges (TCs) were assessed by examining accidents from the National Transportation Safety Board 
(NTSB) database, incidents from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) database, and literature 
from various industry and government sources. The three AEST TCs are engine icing characterization 
and simulation capability; airframe icing simulation and engineering tool capability; and atmospheric 
hazard sensing and mitigation (AHSM) technology capability.  
The NTSB accident data was examined for fixed-wing airplanes operating under Federal Aviation 
Regulation (FAR) Parts 121, 135, and 91 from 1989 to 2008 for atmospheric conditions related to 
airframe icing, ice-crystal engine icing, turbulence, clear air turbulence (CAT), wake vortex, lightning, 
and low visibility (fog, low ceiling, clouds, precipitation, and low lighting). Less than 5 percent of all 
accidents were affected by icing conditions, although when icing was involved in Parts 91 and 135 
scheduled operations, between 25 and 54 percent involved fatalities. No accidents involving ice crystal 
engine icing were found in the NTSB database. Accidents with turbulence were a cause or factor in 
24 percent of Part 121 accidents. Turbulence accidents usually did not involve fatalities. CAT was found 
to be involved in 19 percent of all turbulence accidents. Less than 1 percent of all accidents involved 
either wake vortex or lightning, although this may increase in the future due to denser en route and 
terminal area operations for wake vortex and the introduction of new aircraft with composite structures 
for lightning. Low visibility was involved in between 6 and 23 percent of all accidents depending on 
operational category. Nearly one-third of all accidents are caused by the combined atmospheric conditions 
studied in this analysis. The accident rate for accidents involving any atmospheric condition causal factor 
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declined for Parts 91 and Part 135–NS, increased for Part 135–S, and remained steady for Part 121 
operations.  
The FAA Accident/Incident Data System (AIDS) database was examined for incidents that occurred 
during the years 1985 to 2006 related to airframe icing, ice crystal engine icing, turbulence, CAT, wake 
vortex, lightning, and low visibility for fixed-wing airplanes operating under FAR Part 121, 135, and 91. 
Engine icing was found to be involved in 14 of the incidents, 2 of which specifically cited as “ice 
crystals”. These incidents are often not thoroughly investigated and often lack sufficient detail. Less than 
2 percent of the incidents were affected by airframe icing, and less than 3 percent involved turbulence. 
Low visibility was a factor in 27 percent of the incidents and has declined over the time period. Close to 
one-third of all incidents in Parts 121 and 135 operations were affected by the six atmospheric conditions 
examined in this study. Icing, turbulence, wake vortex, lightning, low lighting and low visibility and have 
declined over the time period of this study. 
Five future aviation safety risk areas associated with the three AEST TCs were identified after an 
exhaustive survey of a variety of sources and include: approach and landing accident reduction, icing/ice 
detection, loss of control (LOC) in flight, super density operations, and runway safety. The focus of 
AEST research is on in-flight icing, both engine and airframe, as well as on investigations of other high-
priority atmospheric hazards and sensor technologies required for their detection. The engine and airframe 
icing TCs will impact the future risk areas of icing/ice detection and LOC in flight. The third TC, AHSM 
technology capability, will impact the future risk areas of approach and landing reduction, icing/ice 
detection, LOC in flight, runway safety, and super density operations. 
1.0 Introduction 
NASA’s Aviation Safety Program (AvSP) includes three research projects. One of these, the 
Atmospheric Environment Safety Technologies (AEST) Project, focuses on three technical challenges 
(TCs) (Ref. 1): 
 
• TC1: Engine icing characterization and simulation capability 
• TC2: Airframe icing simulation and engineering tool capability 
• TC3: Atmospheric hazard sensing and mitigation (AHSM) technology capability 
 
This report analyzes aviation safety trends related to these AEST TCs by reviewing the most current 
statistical and prognostic data available including accident and incident data as well as literature from 
academia, industry, and other Government agencies. This study evaluates possible impacts of the TCs on 
historic and future aviation safety hazards and how aviation safety risk areas change over time. The 
following data and published research were examined: 
 
• Accidents (using the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) Aviation Accident and 
Incident Data System) 
• Incidents (using the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Accident/Incident Data System 
(AIDS) database) 
• Industry and government data and published research sources: 
○ Decadal Survey of Civil Aeronautics, National Research Council 
○ National Aeronautics Research and Development Plan 
○ National Transportation Safety Board Most Wanted Aviation Safety Improvements 2010 
○ Joint Planning and Development Office Safety Working Group Issues Database 
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○ Future Aviation Safety Teams Areas of Change 
○ Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen) Integrated Work Plan 
○ Commercial Aviation Safety Team’s Safety Enhancements 
○ NextGen Implementation Plan 
○ Icing Protection Harmonization Working Group 
2.0 Background 
Public benefits derived from continued growth in passenger and cargo transport depend on intrinsic 
safety improvements on current and future air vehicles to operate in NextGen. The AvSP addresses this 
challenge by conducting cutting-edge, fundamental research to yield innovative algorithms, tools, 
concepts, and technologies from the discipline level up to subsystem and system levels. As part of the 
AvSP, the AEST Project focuses primarily on both engine and airframe in-flight icing. Research also 
includes investigations of other high-priority atmospheric hazards and sensor technologies for their 
detection. The AEST Project will investigate sources of risk and provide technology needed to help 
ensure safe flight in and around atmospheric hazards. 
3.0 Technical Challenge Descriptions 
The AEST Project focuses on the following three TCs: 
 
• TC1: Engine icing characterization and simulation capability: Develop knowledge bases, analysis 
methods, and simulation tools to address engine icing, particularly ice crystal icing. The goal of 
TC1 is to eliminate turbofan engine interruptions, failures, and damage caused by flights into high 
ice crystal content clouds. Research will enable new engine icing protection systems and methods 
and provide a verified basis for engine icing certification requirements.  
• TC2: Airframe icing simulation and engineering tool capability: Develop and demonstrate three-
dimensional simulations and experimental methods for modeling of airframe ice accretion and 
related aerodynamic performance degradation in an icing environment that expands to include 
freezing drizzle and rain for current and future aircraft configurations. The goal of TC2 is to 
achieve acceptance of simulation tools for design and certification of swept-wing configurations 
over an expanded range of icing conditions. Research will develop technology that enables safe 
flight operations in a supercooled large droplet (SLD) environment; enables aircraft 
manufacturers to perform reliable icing assessments; and builds in effective icing mitigation 
approaches for current and future aircraft. 
• TC3: AHSM technology capability: Improve and expand remote sensing and mitigation of 
hazardous atmospheric environments and phenomena. The goals of TC3 are to develop mature 
technologies for sensing and measuring icing, turbulence, and wake vortex hazards to provide 
real-time information to pilots and operators in the National Airspace System (NAS); address low 
visibility conditions for safer runway operations; and advance technologies for lightning-immune 
composite aircraft. Research performed under this TC will provide flight crews with a greater 
ability to avoid hazards, share available information available with other aircraft and ground-
based systems, and reduce the vulnerability of aircraft to lightning and other hazards. 
 
Research will be conducted in several associated subproject elements to address the three TCs shown 
in Figure 1.  
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Figure 1.—AEST Project research framework.  
4.0 National Transportation Safety Board Data Accident Analysis 
The NTSB, an independent Federal agency, investigates every civil aviation accident in the United 
States and significant accidents in other transportation modes. The NTSB also conducts special 
investigations, provides safety studies, and issues safety recommendations to prevent future accidents. 
Reports produced by NTSB investigators provide details about accidents, analysis of factual information, 
conclusions and the probable cause, factors and findings of accidents, and related safety 
recommendations. Causes are the direct source of accidents while factors contribute to accidents. Each 
accident can have multiple causes and factors (Ref. 2). Findings are actions that occurred in conjunction 
with the accident, but were not determined to have contributed to the accident. For example, an aircraft 
might have flown in or near a thunderstorm with lightning, but the lightning had no impact on the flight 
or the accident. Similarly, the flight might have taken place during the night, but lack of visibility in the 
dark had no effect on the flight. Reports are located in the NTSB Aviation Accident and Incident Data 
System. 
The NTSB data was searched for AEST TC-related accidents including the following atmospheric 
conditions that were cited as “causes” or “factors,” but not findings:  
 
• Icing (ice, freezing rain, drizzle, and ice crystals) 
• Turbulence (related to thunderstorm and clear air) 
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• Wake vortex 
• Lightning 
• Low lighting 
• Low visibility (fog, low ceilings, clouds, below approach/landing minimums, haze, smoke, 
obscuration, and whiteout) 
 
Federal Aviation Regulations (FARs) are FAA regulations that govern all aviation activities in the 
United States and are contained in Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations. FARs are organized into 
sections called parts depending on specific types of activity. Other parts regulate certification of pilots, 
schools, and aircraft and their operation (Ref. 3). 
The NTSB database includes accident reports that involved airplanes, helicopters, hot air balloons, 
gliders, ultralight aircraft, etc., and operations conducted under the following operational categories: 
 
• Part 91: General Aviation (small noncommercial aircraft) 
• Part 121: Commercial Air Carriers (aircraft with 10 or more seats) 
• Part 129: Foreign Air Carriers 
• Part 135: Commuters and On-Demand Air Taxis (aircraft with fewer than 10 seats) 
• Part 137: Agricultural Operations 
 
Part 121 operations originally included aircraft with 30 or more seats. In March 1997 the definition 
changed to include aircraft with 10 or more seats. (Ref. 4). 
The NTSB considers each event to be either an accident or an incident using the following definitions 
(Ref. 5): 
 
• Accident: an occurrence associated with the operation of an aircraft, which takes place between 
the time any person boards the aircraft with the intention of flight and all such persons disembark, 
and in which any person suffers death or serious injury, or in which the aircraft receives 
substantial damage. 
• Incident: an occurrence other than an accident, associated with the operation of an aircraft, which 
affects or could affect the safety of operations. 
 
Injuries or aircraft damage that occur when there was no intent for flight (high-speed taxi tests, 
aircraft movement around the airfield, maintenance run-ups, etc.) are, by definition, incidents. 
All recorded accidents involving commercially built fixed-wing airplanes operating under FAR Parts 
121, 135, and 91 regulations were included in this analysis, regardless of whether the investigations are 
preliminary or finalized, and whether or not the events occurred in the United States. Amateur-built and 
experimental aircraft, helicopters, ultralight aircraft, gliders, and balloons were excluded. The only sky 
diving accidents that were included were those caused by the aircraft, not the parachute or parachutist. 
4.1 TC1: Engine Icing Characterization and Simulation Capability 
A search of NTSB accident data did not yield propulsion system-related accidents that were impacted 
by ice crystals. There were accidents, however, that did involve carburetor and/or fuel system icing. 
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4.2 TC2: Airframe Icing Simulation and Engineering Tool Capability 
The database was searched for any accident caused by in-flight icing conditions, freezing rain, or 
drizzle and with or without confirmed ice accretion. Accidents caused by inadequate preflight frost, ice, 
and snow removal were not included in this group. A summary of the accidents caused by in-flight icing 
conditions are found in Table 1. Two types of fatal accident percentages are of interest: the percentage of 
all fatal accidents caused by icing conditions and the percentage of accidents caused by icing conditions 
with a fatality. The numerators in these percentages are identical (fatal accidents caused by icing 
conditions) but the denominators are different. 
Less than 5 percent of the accidents were related to icing conditions. Between 3 and 8 percent of fatal 
accidents and between 3 and 11 percent of fatalities were related to icing conditions. Percentages were 
highest in nonscheduled Part 135 (Part 135–NS) flights, except for the percentage of fatalities, which was 
highest among scheduled Part 135 (Part 135–S) flights. Although the percentage of accidents, fatal 
accidents, and fatalities that were related to icing conditions is low, the percentage of accidents related to 
icing conditions, in which there was at least one fatality, ranges from 25 percent for Part 135–S to 
54 percent for Part 91. 
Figure 2 displays the change in the accident rate (per million flight hours) for accidents that were 
related to icing conditions across four time periods. Rates have declined over time for every category of 
flight operations, except Part 135–S, which increased significantly between the 1994 to 1998 and the 
1999 to 2003 time periods.  
 
 
 
TABLE 1.—ICING-CONDITION-RELATED ACCIDENT DATA BY OPERATIONAL CATEGORY, 1989 TO 2008 
Data category Flight operation category 
Part 121 Part 135–S  Part 135–NS Part 91 
Flight hours, total 317,999,117 24,446,927 61,751,000 507,516,000 
Accidents, total 738 219 1202 26,922 
Accidents per million flight hours 2.321 8.959 19.465 53.047 
 
Accidents caused by icing conditions 5 8 54 321 
Accidents caused by icing conditions per million flight hours 0.015  0.327  0.874 0.632  
Accidents caused by icing conditions, percent  1% (5/738) 
4% 
(8/219 
5% 
(54/1202) 
1% 
(5214/26922) 
 
Fatal accidents, total 67 48 307 5214 
Fatal accidents caused by icing conditions 2 2 23 172 
Fatal accidents caused by icing conditions, percent 3% (2/67) 
4% 
(2/48) 
8% 
(23/307) 
3% 
(172/5214) 
Accidents caused by icing conditions with a fatality, percent 40% (2/5) 
25% 
(2/8) 
43% 
(23/54) 
54% 
(172/5214) 
 
Fatalities, total 1956 309 745 10 109 
Fatalities caused by icing conditions 70 35 27 395 
Fatalities caused by icing conditions, percent 4% (70/1956) 
11% 
(35/309) 
4% 
(27/745) 
4% 
(395/10109) 
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Figure 2.—Icing-related accident rate by operational category across four time periods. 
 
4.3 TC3: Atmospheric Hazard Sensing Mitigation Technology Capability 
The database was searched for accidents caused by turbulence, wake vortex, lightning, low lighting 
and low visibility conditions. Information on icing conditions is found in Section 4.2.  
4.3.1 Turbulence 
A summary of the accidents that were caused by in-flight turbulence are found in Table 2. Turbulence 
related to thunderstorms is included but not terrain-induced or wake vortex turbulence. There are two 
types of fatal accident percentages that are of interest: the percentage of all fatal accidents that included a 
condition (such as turbulence) and the percentage of accidents marked by that condition in which there 
was a fatality. The numerators are identical (e.g., fatal turbulence accidents) but the denominators are 
different. Twenty-four percent of Part 121 accidents, compared with less than 1 percent of accidents in 
other flight operations, were caused by turbulence. Less than 3 percent of fatal accidents and fatalities 
were caused by turbulence, regardless of flight operation. Turbulence was least likely to be a factor in 
Part 135–S accidents, and no fatalities were associated with turbulence in that flight category. Even in 
Part 121 the number of fatalities was very low. However, more than half of the Part 135–NS and Part 91 
accidents that were affected by turbulence included at least one fatality.  
Figure 3 displays the change in the accident rate related to turbulence across four time periods. Rates 
have declined over time for Parts 91 and 135–NS, while Part 135–S rates have increased. As shown in 
Table 2, the total number of accidents affected by turbulence was lowest in Part 135–S. Part 121 
turbulence caused accident rates to increase during the 1994 to 2003 time period before decreasing during 
the 2004 to 2008 time period. 
The AEST Project is particularly interested in reducing the risk of encounters with clear air 
turbulence (CAT). Figure 4 displays the change in the accident rate related to CAT across the four time 
periods. The rate for Part 135–S has increased dramatically in the most recent time period. Table 3 
summarizes CAT-related accidents, which accounts for 19 percent of all turbulence-related accidents (64 
of 344 turbulence-caused accidents). CAT was involved in 6 percent of all Part 121 accidents and was 
more likely to be a factor in Part 121 operations than Parts 135 or 91. Most CAT accidents did not involve 
a fatality. 
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TABLE 2.—TURBULENCE-RELATED-ACCIDENT DATA BY OPERATIONAL CATEGORY, 1989 TO 2008 
Data Category Flight operation category 
Part 121 Part 135–S Part 135–NS Part 91 
Flight hours, total 317,999,117 24,446,927 61,751,000 507,516,000 
Accidents, total 738 219 1202 26,922 
Accidents per million flight hours 2.321 8.959 19.465 53.047 
 
Accidents caused by turbulence 180 2 9 153 
Accidents caused by turbulence per million flight hours 0.566  0.082  0.146 0.301  
Accidents caused by turbulence, percent  24% (180/738) 
1% 
(2/219) 
1% 
(9/1202) 
1% 
(153/26922) 
 
Fatal accidents, total 67 48 307 5214 
Fatal accidents caused by turbulence  2 0 5 91 
Fatal accidents caused by turbulence, percent 3% (2/67) 
0% 
(0/48) 
2% 
(5/307) 
2% 
(91/5214) 
Accidents caused by turbulence with a fatality, percent 1% (2/180) 
0% 
(0/2) 
56% 
(5/9) 
60% 
(91/153) 
 
Fatalities, total 1956 309 745 10,109 
Fatalities caused by turbulence 2 0 8 201 
Fatalities caused by turbulence, percent 0% (2/1956) 
0% 
(0/309) 
1% 
(8/745) 
2% 
(201/10109) 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.—Turbulence-related accident rate by operational category across four time periods. 
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Figure 4.—Clear-air-turbulence-related accident rate by operational category 
across four time periods.  
 
TABLE 3.—CLEAR-AIR-TURBULENCE-RELATED ACCIDENT DATA BY OPERATIONAL CATEGORY, 1989 TO 2008 
Data category 
Flight operation category 
Part 121 Part 135–S Part 135–NS Part 91 
Flight hours, total 317,999,117 24,446,927 61,751,000 507,516,000 
Accidents, total 738 219 1,202 26,922 
Accidents per million flight hours 2.321 8.959 19.465 53.047 
 
Accidents caused by CATa  45 1 1 17 
Accidents caused by CAT per million flight hours 0.142  0.041  0.016 0.033  
Accidents caused by CAT, percent 6% (45/738) 
1% 
(1/219) 
0% 
(1/1202) 
0% 
(17/26922) 
 
Fatal accidents, total 67 48 307 5214 
Fatal accidents caused by CAT 1 0 1 3 
Fatal accidents caused by CAT, percent 2% (1/67) 
0% 
(0/48) 
0% 
(1/307) 
2% 
(17/5214) 
Accidents caused by CAT, percent 2% (1/45) 
0% 
(0/1) 
100% 
(1/1) 
18% 
(3/17) 
 
Fatalities, total 1956 309 745 10,109 
Fatalities caused by CAT 1 0 1 8 
Fatalities caused by CAT, percent 0% (1/1956) 
0% 
(0/309) 
0% 
(1/745) 
0% 
(8/10109) 
aClear air turbulence. 
4.3.2 Wake Vortex 
A summary of accidents caused by wake vortex are found in Table 4. These numbers include aircraft 
that were impacted by the wake vortex, not the aircraft that caused the wake vortex encounter. Jet blast or 
propeller wash from engine run-up or movements from a standing position were not included either. In 
general, less than 1 percent of all accidents, fatal accidents, and fatalities were related to wake vortex, 
except that 2 percent of fatal accidents in Part 135–S were associated with wake vortex. This single 
accident resulted in three fatalities. Two of the three Part 135–NS wake vortex accidents included at least 
one fatality (67 percent). Almost 12 percent of the Part 91 wake vortex accidents were fatal. 
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Figure 5 displays the change in the accident rate related to wake vortex across four time periods. 
Rates have remained fairly constant over time, except for Part 91, which has shown a consistent decline. 
Although the accident rate caused by wake vortex has been low and decreasing during this study, 
expected growth in the demand for air transportation will require denser en route and terminal area 
operations, resulting in an increase in likelihood of an encounter with a wake vortex.  
 
 
TABLE 4.—WAKE VORTEX-RELATED ACCIDENT DATA BY OPERATIONAL CATEGORY, 1989 TO 2008 
Data category Flight operation category 
Part 121 Part 135–S Part 135–NS Part 91 
Flight hours, total 317,999,117 24,446,927 61,751,000 507,516,000 
Accidents, total 738 219 1,202 26,922 
Accidents per million flight hours 2.321 8.959 19.465 53.047 
 
Accidents caused by wake vortex 5 1 3 61 
Accidents caused by wake vortex per million flight hours 0.016 0.041 0.049 0.120  
Accidents caused by vortex, percent  1% (5/738) 
1% 
(1/219) 
0% 
(3/1202) 
0% 
(61/26922) 
 
Fatal accidents, total 67 48 307 5214 
Fatal accidents caused by wake vortex 0 1 2 7 
Fatal accidents caused by wake vortex, percent 0% (0/67) 
2% 
(1/48) 
1% 
(2/307) 
0% 
(7/5214) 
Accidents caused by vortex with a fatality, percent 0% (0/5) 
100% 
(1/1) 
67% 
(2/3) 
12% 
(7/61) 
 
Fatalities, total 1956 309 745 10,109 
Fatalities caused by wake vortex 0 3 6 15 
Fatalities caused by wake vortex, percent 0% (0/1956) 
1% 
(3/309) 
1% 
(6/745) 
0% 
(15/10109) 
 
 
 
Figure 5.—Wake-vortex-related accident rate by operational category across four 
time periods. 
 
 
 
NASA/TM—2014-217729 11 
4.3.3 Lightning Strikes 
A summary of accidents caused by lightning are found in Table 5. In general, lightning was a cause or 
factor in less than one-half of 1 percent of all accidents, fatal accidents, and fatalities. The one exception 
was that 2 percent of the Part 121 fatal accidents were associated with lightning. This single accident in 
1989 resulted in one fatality when lightning struck an aircraft in the ramp area, and a ground crew 
member was connected to the aircraft via headset. There were no lightning-related fatal accidents in Part 
135, but 64 percent of the Part 91 lightning-related accidents were fatal.  
Figure 6 displays the accident rate related to lightning across four time periods. With the exception of 
Part 135–S, rates have been fairly consistent over time. 
 
TABLE 5.—LIGHTNING-RELATED ACCIDENT DATA BY OPERATIONAL CATEGORY, 1989 TO 2008 
Data category Flight operation category 
Part 121 Part 135–S Part 135–NS Part 91 
Flight hours, total 317,999,117 24,446,927 61,751,000 507,516,000 
Accidents, total 738 219 1,202 26,922 
Accidents per million flight hours 2.321 8.959 19.465 53.047 
 
Accidents caused by lightning 3 0 2 14 
Accidents caused by lightning per million flight hours 0.009  0.000  0.032 0.028  
Accidents caused by lightning, percent  0% (3/738) 
0% 
(0/219) 
0% 
(2/1202) 
0% 
(14/26922) 
 
Fatal accidents, total 67 48 307 5214 
Fatal accidents caused by lightning  1 0 0 9 
Fatal accidents caused by lightning, percent 2% (1/67) 
0% 
(0/48) 
0% 
(0/307) 
0% 
(9/5214) 
Accidents caused by lightning with a fatality, percent 33% (1/3) 
0% 
(0/0) 
0% 
(0/2) 
64% 
(9/14) 
 
Fatalities, total 1956 309 745 10,109 
Fatalities caused by lightning  1 0 0 19 
Fatalities caused by lightning, percent 0% (1/1956) 
0% 
(0/309) 
0% 
(0/745) 
0% 
(19/10109) 
 
 
Figure 6.—Lightning-related accident rate by operational category across four time 
periods. 
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4.3.4 Low Visibility 
In this report, low visibility refers to fog, low ceiling or clouds, below approach minimums, haze, 
smoke, obscuration, whiteout conditions, sand/dust storms, sun glare, precipitation, low lighting and 
unspecified visibility issues. “Visibility is the farthest distance at which an observer can distinguish 
objects. Ceiling is the altitude to the nearest cloud layer that obscures at least half of the sky” (Ref. 6). 
Low lighting conditions at dusk, dawn, and nighttime have a profound impact on safety. Low lighting 
conditions occur, for example, when the Moon is not present, there is extensive cloud cover, or manmade 
lighting (from around a city) is limited or nonexistent. Narratives from some accidents mention lack of 
visibility without being specific for example, instrument meteorological conditions (IMC) or some sort of 
precipitation, usually rain or snow. 
A summary of the accidents that were related to low visibility are found in Table 6. The frequency of 
accidents caused by low visibility conditions varied across the four flight operation categories. In Part 
121, low visibility caused 6 percent of all accidents and 6 percent of fatal accidents. In Part 91, low 
visibility caused 10 percent of accidents and 31 percent of fatal accidents. Part 135 flights were affected 
most by low visibility (19 to 23 percent of accidents and 37 to 40 percent of fatal accidents).  
Figure 7 displays the change in the accident rate related to low visibility conditions across four time 
periods. The rate for Part 121 remained steady across the time periods, while Parts 91 and 135–NS rates 
declined.  
 
 
 
TABLE 6.—LOW-VISIBILITY-RELATED ACCIDENT DATA BY OPERATIONAL CATEGORY, 1989 TO 2008 
Data category Flight operation category 
Part 121 Part 135–S Part 135–NS Part 91 
Flight hours, total 317,999,117 24,446,927 61,751,000 507,516,000 
Accidents, total 738 219 1202 26,922 
Accidents per million flight hours 2.321 8.959 19.465 53.047 
 
Accidents caused by low visibility 41 51 227 2689 
Accidents caused by low visibility per million flight hours 0.129  2.086  3.676 5.298  
Accidents caused by low visibility, percent  6% (41/738) 
23% 
(51/219) 
19% 
(227/1202) 
10% 
(2689/26922) 
 
Fatal accidents, total 67 48 307 5214 
Fatal accidents caused by low visibility  4 19 114 1606 
Accidents caused by low visibility with a fatality, percent 6% (4/67) 
40% 
(19/48) 
37% 
(114/307) 
31% 
(1606/5214) 
Fatal accidents caused by low visibility, percent 10% (4/41) 
37% 
(19/51) 
50% 
(114/227) 
60% 
(1606/2689) 
 
Fatalities, total 1956 309 745 10,109 
Fatalities caused by low visibility  22 92 279 3238 
Fatalities caused by low visibility, percent 0% (1/1956) 
0% 
(0/309) 
34% 
(279/745) 
32% 
(3238/10109) 
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Figure 7.—Low-visibility-related accident rate by operational category across four 
time periods. 
 
Accidents with low visibility as causes or factors were further sorted by the following types of low 
visibility to include 
 
• Fog 
• Low ceiling or clouds 
• Precipitation 
• Low lighting (dusk, dawn, or nighttime) 
• Unspecified 
 
Accidents caused by these types of low visibility conditions are summarized in Table 7. More than 
one condition might have affected particular accidents. In Parts 121, 135–NS and 91, the most likely low 
visibility condition was low lighting (39 to 80 percent). Low lighting was involved in 80 percent of Part 
121 low-visibility-related accidents.  In contrast, low ceiling and clouds were a cause in 42 to 53 percent 
of Parts 135 and 91 accidents, yet rarely a cause in Part 121 accidents. 
4.3.5 All Six Atmospheric Conditions 
A summary of accidents related to any of the atmospheric conditions previously discussed (icing, 
turbulence, CAT, wake vortex, lightning, and low visibility) are found in Table 8. Nearly one-third of Part 
121 accidents had one or more of these six atmospheric conditions as a cause or factor, with only 
4 percent involving a fatality. The lowest percentage of accidents caused by any of the atmospheric 
conditions was in Part 91, yet 58 percent involved fatalities. 
Figure 8 displays the change in the accident rate related to the following atmospheric conditions 
across four time periods: icing, turbulence, CAT, wake vortex, lightning, and low visibility. Rates 
declined in every time period for Parts 91 and 135–NS, while Part 135–S operations increased. Part 121 
operations remained somewhat steady over  the  time periods. 
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TABLE 7.—LOW VISIBILITY-RELATED ACCIDENT FREQUENCY BY TYPE  
AND OPERATIONAL CATEGORY, 1989 TO 2008 
Data category Flight operation category 
Part 121 Part 135–S Part 135–NS Part 91 
Total 41 51 227 2689 
Fog 4 (10%) 15 (29%) 58 (26%) 677 (25%)  
Low ceiling/clouds 1 (2%) 27 (53%) 96 (42%)  1203 (45%) 
Precipitation 7 (17%) 13 (25%) 45 (20%) 329 (12%)  
Low lighting  33 (80%)  20 (39%) 116 (51%) 1427 (53%) 
Unspecified 2 (5%) 13 (25%) 48 (21%) 382 (14%) 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 8.—ATMOSPHERICa CONDITION-RELATED ACCIDENT DATA  
BY OPERATIONAL CATEGORY, 1989 TO 2008 
Data category Flight operation category 
Part 121 Part 135–S Part 135–NS Part 91 
Flight hours, total 317,999,117 24,446,927 61,751,000 507,516,000 
Accidents, total 738 219 1202 26,922 
Accidents per million flight hours 2.321 8.959 19.465 53.047 
 
Accidents caused by atmospheric conditions 234 61 279 3102 
Accidents caused by atmospheric conditions per million 
flight hours 0.736  2.495  4.518 6.112  
Accidents caused by  atmospheric conditions, percent 32% (234/738) 
28% 
(61/219) 
23% 
(279/1202) 
12% 
(3102/26922) 
 
Fatal accidents, total 67 48 307 5214 
Fatal accidents caused by atmospheric conditions 9 22 139 1783 
Fatal accidents caused by atmospheric conditions, percent 13% (9/67) 
46% 
(22/48) 
45% 
(139/307) 
34% 
(1783/5214) 
Accidents caused by atmospheric conditions with a fatality, 
percent 
4% 
(9/234) 
36% 
(22/61) 
50% 
(139/279) 
58% 
(1783/3102) 
 
Fatalities, total 1956 309 745 10,109 
Accident fatalities caused by atmospheric conditions 95 130 312 3649 
Fatalities caused by atmospheric conditions, percent 5% (95/1956) 
42% 
(130/309) 
42% 
(312/745) 
36% 
(3649/10109) 
aIcing, turbulence, CAT, wake vortex, lightning, and low visibility combined. 
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Figure 8.—Atmospheric-condition-related accident rate (icing, turbulence, CAT, 
wake vortex, lightning, and low visibility combined) by operational category 
across four time periods. 
5.0 Federal Aviation Administration Incident Data Analysis 
Each incident and accident is reported to the FAA by pilots, airport personnel, and private citizens 
although the NTSB does not investigate all incidents. The FAA maintains the Accident/Incident Data 
System (AIDS) database with the information contained in these reports and collected in their 
investigations.  
A copy of the FAA’s AIDS database was obtained from the Aviation Safety Information Analysis and 
Sharing (ASIAS) System in October 2007—late enough in the year that nearly all incidents from 1985 to 
2006 had been investigated.  
FAA incident data are far less detailed than NTSB accident data. Weather and visibility conditions 
are mentioned without specifying causality. All mentions of fog, low ceilings, dusk or night flight, or less 
than one mile visibility were included in the low visibility results, as were those mentioned in the 
narratives of Visual Flight Rules (VFR) flight into IMC conditions and other unspecified, restricted 
visibility conditions. These unspecific visibility conditions are referred to as “unspecified” later in the 
report. Precipitation-related incidents were evaluated to determine whether the precipitation impacted the 
visibility or runway conditions. 
Among the incidents in this analysis were some midair and ground collisions between multiple 
aircraft. The database includes an incident record for each aircraft involved, unless the aircraft was parked 
and unoccupied. In order to reduce the analysis data set to one record for each incident, incidents that 
involved multiple aircraft were reviewed and reports for passive aircraft (i.e., aircraft that was hit during 
the collision) were eliminated.  
5.1 TC1: Engine Icing Characterization and Simulation Capability 
A search of the FAA incident database showed that 38 incidents were caused by the propulsion 
system. Of the 38 incidents, 14 were caused by icing conditions or ice ingestion. Only two incidents 
specifically cited ice crystals in the propulsion system as a cause. Both of these incidents resulted in 
flameouts of all engines, cited a lack of training on the hazards of high-altitude ice crystals to turbine fan 
engines, and occurred in Florida. Of interest is a third incident that involved multiple-engine flameouts 
after passing through thunderstorms near Miami, Florida, but the report did not cite engine icing. Because 
a majority of the propulsion system-related incidents were not thoroughly investigated, clear causes of the 
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failures were not provided. Table 9 summarizes incidents that involved any form of engine icing. Most of 
the engine icing incidents occurred during Part 121 operations. Figure 9 provides the incident rate related 
to engine icing across four time periods. 
5.2 TC2: Airframe Icing Simulation and Engineering Tool Capability 
This section examines incidents that were related to in-flight icing conditions, freezing rain, or 
drizzle, with or without confirmed ice accretion. Incidents caused by inadequate preflight frost, ice, or 
snow removal were not included in this group. A summary of the incidents that were affected by in-flight 
icing conditions is found in Table 10. Less than 1 percent of incidents were affected by icing conditions. 
Figure 10 displays the incident rate related to icing conditions across four time periods. Rates have 
declined over time for each flight operations category except for Part 135–S. Rates for 2004 to 2008 are 
underestimated because they do not include 2 years of incident data.  
 
 
 
TABLE 9.—ENGINE-ICING-RELATED INCIDENT DATA BY OPERATIONAL CATEGORY, 1989 TO 2006 
Data category Flight operation category 
Part 121 Part 135–S Part 135–NS Part 91 
Flight hours, total 317,999,117 24,446,927 61,751,000 507,516,000 
Incidents, total 7647 1921 2189 27,919 
Incidents per million flight hours 24.047 78.578 35.449 55.011 
 
Incidents caused by engine icing 7  3 1 2 
Incidents caused by engine icing per million flight hours 0.022 0.123 0.016  0.004 
Incidents caused by engine icing, percent 0% (7/7647) 
0% 
(8/21921) 
1% 
(28/2189) 
0% 
(2/27919) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9.—Engine icing–related incident rate by operational category across four 
time periods. 
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TABLE 10.—ICING-RELATED INCIDENT DATA BY OPERATIONAL CATEGORY, 1989 TO 2006 
Data category Flight operation category 
Part 121 Part 135–S Part 135–NS Part 91 
Flight hours, total 317,999,117 24,446,927 61,751,000 507,516,000 
Incidents, total 7647 1921 2189 27,919 
Incidents per million flight hours 24.047 78.578 35.449 55.011 
 
Incidents caused by icing conditions 32 8 28 95 
Incidents caused by icing conditions per million flight hours 0.101  0.327  0.453 0.187 
Incidents caused by icing conditions, percent 0% (32/7647) 
0% 
(8/21921) 
1% 
(28/2189) 
0% 
(95/27919) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10.—Icing-related incident rate by operational category across four time 
periods. 
 
 
5.3 TC3: Atmospheric Hazard Sensing and Mitigation Technology Capability 
This section examines incidents that were related to turbulence, wake vortex, lightning, low lighting 
and low visibility conditions. Information on icing conditions is found in Section 5.2.  
5.3.1 Turbulence 
A summary of the incidents that were affected by in-flight turbulence is found in Table 11. Terrain-
induced and wake vortex turbulence are not included here, but turbulence related to thunderstorms is 
included. Less than 1 percent of all incidents in the FAA AIDS database were caused by turbulence. 
Figure 11 displays the incident rate related to turbulence across four time periods. The incidence rate has 
declined for all operation categories.  
Of particular interest to the AEST Project is reducing the risk of encounters with CAT. Table 12 
summarizes CAT-related incidents, which accounted for 3 percent of all turbulence-related incidents (10 
of 295). Figure 12 displays the change in the incident rate related to CAT across four time periods. The 
rate has declined over time for Part 121 operations.  
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A summary of the incidents that were related to wake vortex are found in Table 13. These numbers 
include only aircraft that were affected by the wake vortex encounter, not the aircraft responsible for the 
wake vortex. Jet blast or propeller wash from engine run-up or movement from a standing position was 
not included either. Less than 1 percent of all incidents were influenced by wake vortex. Figure 13 
displays the change in the incident rate related to wake vortex across four time periods. These rates 
increased during 1994 to 1998 and then decreased in the last two time periods. Although the incident rate 
related to wake vortex has been low and decreasing in the time period of this study, expected growth in 
the demand for air transportation will require denser en route and terminal area operations resulting in the 
need for wake vortex mitigation.  
 
TABLE 11.—TURBULENCE-RELATED INCIDENT DATA BY OPERATIONAL CATEGORY, 1989 TO 2006 
Data category Flight operation category 
Part 121 Part 135–S Part 135–NS Part 91 
Flight hours, total 317,999,117 24,446,927 61,751,000 507,516,000 
Incidents, total 7647 1921 2189 27,919 
Incidents per million flight hours 24.047 78.578 35.449 55.011 
 
Incidents in turbulence 190 8 17 80 
Incidents caused by turbulence per million flight hours 00.597  0.327   0.275 0.158 
Incidents caused by turbulence, percent 2% (190/7647) 
0% 
(8/21921) 
1% 
(17/2189) 
0% 
(80/27919) 
 
 
Figure 11.—Turbulence-related incident rate by operational category across four 
time periods. 
 
TABLE 12.—CLEAR-AIR-TURBULENCE-RELATED INCIDENT DATA BY OPERATIONAL CATEGORY, 1989 TO 2006 
Data category Flight operation category 
Part 121 Part 135–S Part 135–NS Part 91 
Flight hours, total 317,999,117 24,446,927 61,751,000 507,516,000 
Incidents, total 7647 1921 2189 27,919 
Incidents per million flight hours 24.047 78.578 35.449 55.011 
 
Incidents caused by CATa 8 1 0 1 
Incidents caused by CAT per million flight hours 0.025 0.041 0.000 0.002 
Incidents caused by CAT, percent 0% (8/7647) 
0% 
02/21921) 
0% 
(3/2189) 
0% 
(1/27919) 
aClear air turbulence. 
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Figure 12.—Clear-air-turbulence-related incident rate by operational category 
across four time periods. 
 
TABLE 13.—WAKE-VORTEX-RELATED INCIDENT DATA BY OPERATIONAL CATEGORY, 1989 TO 2006 
Incident data Flight operation category 
Part 121 Part 135–S Part 135–NS Part 91 
Flight hours, total 317,999,117 24,446,927 61,751,000 507,516,000 
Incidents, total 7647 1921 2189 27,919 
Incidents per million flight hours 24.047 78.578 35.449 55.011 
 
Incidents caused by wake vortex 18 2 3 38 
Incidents caused by wake vortex per million flight hours 0.057  0.082  0.049 0.075 
Incidents caused by wake vortex, percent  0% (18/7647) 
0% 
(2/21921) 
0% 
(3/2189) 
0% 
(38/27919) 
 
 
Figure 13.—Wake-vortex-related incident rate by operational category across four 
time periods. 
5.3.2 Lightning 
A summary of the incidents that were related to lightning are found in Table 14. Less than 1 percent 
of all FAA database incidents cited lightning as a cause or factor. Figure 14 displays the change in the 
incident rate related to lightning across four time periods. Generally, the incident rate has decreased for all 
operational categories over time.  
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TABLE 14.—LIGHTNING-RELATED INCIDENT DATA BY OPERATIONAL CATEGORY, 1989 TO 2006 
Incident data Flight operation category 
Part 121 Part 135–S Part 135–NS Part 91 
Flight hours, total 317,999,117 24,446,927 61,751,000 507,516,000 
Incidents, total 7647 1921 2189 27,919 
Incidents per million flight hours 24.047 78.578 35.449 55.011 
 
Incidents caused by lightning 38 5 2 16 
Incidents caused by lightning per million flight hours 0.199  0.205  0.032 0.032 
Incidents caused by lightning, percent 1% (38/7647) 
0% 
(5/21921) 
0% 
(2/2189) 
0% 
(16/27919) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 14.—Lightning-related incident rate by operational category across four time 
periods. 
 
5.3.3 Low Visibility 
A summary of the incidents that were related to low visibility are found in Table 15. Low visibility 
conditions affected the flight operations categories differently. In Part 121, low visibility affected 
27 percent of all incidents, while in Part 135, low visibility impacted between 31 and 34 percent of 
incidents. Figure 15 displays the change in the incident rate related to low visibility across four time 
periods. The incident rate related to low visibility declined for all operational categories over time.  
Incidents with low visibility as a cause or factor were further sorted by the type of low visibility to 
include 
 
• Fog 
• Low ceiling or clouds 
• Precipitation 
• Low lighting (dusk, dawn, or nighttime) 
• Nonspecific 
 
These low visibility conditions are summarized in Table 16. More than one condition might affect a 
particular incident. In all operational categories the most frequent condition was low lighting ranging 
from 13 to 30 percent.  
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TABLE 15.—LOW-VISIBILITY-RELATED INCIDENT DATA BY OPERATIONAL CATEGORY, 1989 TO 2006 
Incident data Flight operation category 
Part 121 Part 135–S Part 135–NS Part 91 
Flight hours, total 317,999,117 24,446,927 61,751,000 507,516,000 
Incidents, total 7647 1921 2189 27,919 
Incidents per million flight hours 24.047 78.578 35.449 55.011 
 
Incidents caused by low visibility 2056 592 733 4329 
Incidents caused by low visibility per million flight hours 6.465  24.216  11.870 8.530 
Incidents caused by low visibility, percent 27% (2056/7647) 
31% 
(592/21921) 
34% 
(733/2189) 
16% 
(4329/27919) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 15.—Low-visibility-related incident rate by operational category across four 
time periods. 
 
 
 
TABLE 16.—LOW VISIBILITY-RELATED INCIDENT FREQUENCY 
BY TYPE AND OPERATIONAL CATEGORY, 1989 TO 2008 
Low visibility type Flight operation category 
Part 121 Part 135–S Part 135–NS Part 91 
Low visibility, total 7647 1921 2189 27919 
Fog  167 (2%)  80 (4%) 69 (3%) 407 (2%) 
Low ceiling or clouds  194 (1%)  20 (1%) 46 (2%) 231 (1%) 
Precipitation  133 (2%) 59 (3%) 69 (3%) 251 (1%) 
Low lighting  1879 (25%) 512 (27%) 663 (30%) 3743 (13%) 
Unspecified visibility  64 (5%)  38(2%) 26 (1%) 270 (1%) 
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5.3.4 Atmospheric Conditions Summary 
A summary of the incidents affected by any of the six atmospheric conditions (icing, turbulence, 
CAT, wake vortex, lightning, and low visibility) are found in Table 17. Close to one-third of all incidents 
involved icing, turbulence, wake vortex, lightning, or low lighting/visibility for all operational categories 
except Part 91. Figure 16 displays the change in the incident rate (per million flight hours) for incidents 
affected by any of the six atmospheric conditions across four time periods showing a decline across all 
operational categories over time. 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 17.—ATMOSPHERICa CONDITION-RELATED INCIDENT DATA BY OPERATIONAL CATEGORY, 1989 TO 2008 
Incident Data Category Flight operation category 
Part 121 Part 135–S Part 135–NS Part 91 
Flight hours, total 317,999,117 24,446,927 61,751,000 507,516,000 
Incidents, total 7647 1921 2189 27,919 
Incidents per million flight hours 24.047 78.578 35.449 55.011 
 
Incidents caused by atmospheric conditions 2260 606 758 4508 
Incidents caused by atmospheric conditions per million flight hours 7.107  24.788  12.275 8.882 
Percentage of incidents caused by atmospheric condition, percent 30% (2260/7647) 
32% 
(606/1921) 
35% 
(758/2189) 
16% 
(4508/27919) 
aIcing, turbulence, CAT, wake vortex, lightning, and low visibility combined. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 16.—Atmospheric-condition-related incidents rate (icing, turbulence, CAT, 
wake vortex, lightning, and low visibility combined) by operational category 
across four time periods. 
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6.0 Future Safety Risk Analysis 
This section assesses the projected impact of the AEST TCs on the future aviation safety risks listed 
below. These future aviation safety risks were previously identified by the Aviation Safety Program’s 
Systems Analysis Team after an exhaustive survey of a variety of sources (Ref. 7). Ten critical future 
safety risk areas were identified and include (in alphabetical order, not priority): 
 
(1) Aircraft mixed fleet equipage 
(2) Approach and landing accident reduction 
(3) Enhanced survivability in the event of an accident 
(4) Human fatigue 
(5) Icing and ice detection 
(6) Inadequate protection, analysis, and dissemination of safety data 
(7) Increasing complexity and reliance on automation 
(8) LOC—in flight 
(9) Runway safety 
(10) Super density operations 
 
The AEST Project could have potential impact on 5 of the 10 critical future safety risk areas. A 
description of each of those five areas and applicable AEST TC research is provided in Section 6.1. 
6.1 Approach and Landing Accident Reduction 
Approach and landing is the most demanding phase of flight and carries the highest safety risk. This 
risk area includes unstabilized approaches, that is, approaches where airspeed, rate of descent, aircraft 
attitude, configuration, or power settings do not meet stabilized approach criteria at the prescribed 
approach point. These types of accidents often are manifestations of deficiencies that begin in or prior to 
the approach phase. 
Approach and landing accidents often involve high-energy approaches. The most significant threats 
during approach are fast airspeeds, high groundspeeds (not appreciating wind effects), and high and/or 
steep approach above the desired flight path. Early control of high energy, the combination of these 
conditions, can reduce these threats. Situations should be assessed based on the following parameters: 
airspeed, altitude, runway length, runway surface conditions, wind, and visibility. Stabilized approaches 
provide bases for good landings. Monitoring these flight parameters to detect anomalies is crucial to 
understanding causes of unstabilized approaches and, therefore, to discovering precursors to potential 
approach and landing accidents. Adverse environmental conditions in the terminal area that cause external 
hazards and disturbances, such as icing, freezing rain, and strong wake turbulence, are also precursors to 
approach and landing accidents. 
The AEST Project is conducting research in airframe icing to simulate and model airframe and swept-
wing ice accretion and related aerodynamic performance degradation for current and future aircraft 
configurations in an expanded icing environment that includes freezing drizzle and rain. A significant 
outcome of this research will be the ability to accurately predict the ice-shape profile that could result 
from an icing encounter in supercooled large droplet (SLD) conditions. This capability will allow analysis 
of the SLD ice accretion impact on aircraft performance, ice protection systems, and ice detection 
systems. With the limited SLD-experimental simulation capabilities that are currently available it is 
critical that computational-SLD ice-accretion simulation tools be developed, especially for freezing rain 
conditions. Airframe icing research will develop the experimental and computational simulation 
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capability to prevent and mitigate adverse events during the approach phase of flight using reliable icing 
assessments and effective design approaches. 
The National Research Council (NRC) recognizes the need to develop techniques, including lidar and 
laser-acoustic systems, and to predict and measure the formation, trajectory, and decay of upstream wake 
vortices. In addition, affordable new sensors, system technologies, and procedures must be developed to 
improve prediction and measurement of wake strength, location, motion, and aircraft upset risk in 
terminal and en route airspace to enable safe flight with reduced in-trail wake separation (Ref. 8). AHSM 
research is focused on developing mature technologies to sense and measure icing, turbulence, and wake 
vortex hazards to provide aircraft with a greater ability to avoid external hazards including icing 
conditions, kinetic air hazards, and convective weather.  
The goal of AEST icing weather systems research is to enable safe flight through hazardous 
environmental conditions during the critical approach and landing phase of flight. Milestone AEST3.3.27 
will allow development and assessment of icing hazard detection algorithms for terminal area coverage. 
Milestones AEST4.3.05 and AEST4.3.09 in the lidar electro-optical research element are aimed at 
conducting field tests to determine the imaging capability of real-time observation of wake vortices and to 
characterize wake vortex hazards in the terminal area. 
6.2 Icing and Ice Detection 
Adverse weather conditions, including storms and icing conditions, significantly reduce the capacity 
and reliability of the air transportation system. Adverse weather also degrades system safety. In-flight or 
ground (i.e., deicing-related) accumulation of snow, ice, freezing rain, or frost on aircraft surfaces and 
sensors adversely affects aircraft control and performance. This issue is important to both civil and 
military aviation, and is critical for all types of aircraft, particularly for turboprop aircraft. Research is 
needed to improve the ability to predict and monitor environmental conditions and to develop robust 
aerodynamic designs and techniques for adverse conditions. Currently, icing hazards are handled by 
regulatory constraints on flight operations, and prediction techniques are largely empirical. Low-cost 
techniques to measure upstream environmental conditions should be developed. Techniques to predict 
and mitigate the impact of adverse environmental conditions on the aircraft operation, including 
validation of icing prediction capabilities, should be improved (Ref. 8). 
AEST research conducted under the TC2, airframe icing simulation and engineering tool capability, 
will produce ice accretion models that will be validated over the freezing drizzle and freezing rain SLD 
icing regime. This capability will allow regulators and aircraft manufacturers to use computational codes 
for more effective designs and as a basis for certification. Research will be conducted to develop and 
demonstrate a validated computational-simulation capability for ice buildup on three-dimensional aircraft 
surfaces that are subjected to SLD icing conditions. A significant outcome of this research will be the 
ability to accurately predict the ice-shape profile resulting from an icing encounter in SLD conditions. 
This capability will allow analysis of the impact of SLD ice accretions on aircraft performance, ice 
protection systems, and ice detection systems. With the limited experimental SLD simulation capabilities 
that are currently available, it is critical that computational SLD ice-accretion simulation tools be 
developed, especially for freezing rain conditions. 
The consequences of operating an airplane in icing conditions without first having thoroughly 
demonstrated adequate handling and controllability characteristics in those conditions are sufficiently 
severe that they warrant a thorough certification test program, including application of revised standards 
to airplanes that are currently certified for flight in icing conditions. The airframe icing safety issue is well 
known and has been confirmed by several studies and by the international icing community. The aviation 
community, including airframe manufacturers, airlines, pilots, and the flying public, is aware of the 
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problem and is calling for it to be addressed. Their concerns have been well documented in expert venues 
including the FAA Ice Protection Harmonization Working Group (Refs. 9 and 10) and the NASA 2009 
Airframe Icing Workshop. In addition, the joint government/industry Commercial Aviation Safety Team 
has developed a safety enhancement plan to encourage manufacturers of new turboprop-type designs to 
adapt and implement systems that automatically detect the presence of icing conditions that exceed those 
for which the aircraft has been certified including an estimate of accretion rate for advisory purposes and 
to provide annunciation to the flight crew if feasible (Ref. 11).  
Finally, the NTSB’s “Most Wanted List” includes “Reduce Dangers to Aircraft Flying in Icing 
Conditions” as one of their top 10 transportation improvements. The NTSB’s specific recommendations 
for reducing these dangers are to use current research on freezing rain and large water droplets to revise 
the way aircraft are designed and approved for flight in icing conditions; to apply revised icing 
requirements to currently certificated aircraft; and to require that airplanes with pneumatic deice boots 
activate the boots as soon as the airplane enters icing conditions (Ref. 12). Research to address TC2 is 
focused on assessing current ice protection system simulation methods and on developing strategies for 
improving the experimental capability for ice protection systems in ground-based icing facilities. 
Strategies will also be recommended for improving experimental ice-accretion simulation capabilities for 
ice buildup on aircraft surfaces that are subjected to SLD icing conditions. 
There is a significant need for increased detection, information collection, and mitigation capabilities 
for atmospheric hazards, including icing conditions. Terminal area ground remote sensing to monitor and 
enforce pending regulations for SLD icing certification is not currently available. Operations will require 
real-time atmospheric diagnostic capabilities beyond those being used today. Research conducted under 
the icing weather systems development element of TC3, AHSM technology capability, will address this 
need by improving the detection and measurement capabilities for in-flight icing hazards and also by 
further developing NASA AvSP remote sensing technologies research. An important Level 1 milestone 
(AEST3.1.06) will focus on conducting a terminal area icing algorithm and remote sensing system 
assessment to meet joint FAA and NASA standards. The resulting operational capabilities and constraints 
of the terminal area icing remote sensing systems will either define additional development work required 
or enable installation of these systems into the NextGen airspace system. 
The icing and ice detection critical future safety risk area encompasses engine icing as well as the 
icing hazards encountered on the airframe and aircraft surfaces. The term “engine icing” has been used 
historically to describe ice accreting on exposed engine surfaces as an aircraft flies through a cloud of 
SLDs. Liquid droplets freeze on impact, or shortly thereafter, and form obstructions and distortions to air 
flowing into engines. Engine icing caused by ice accretion inside the normally hot core of jet-based 
engines that fly in clouds containing highly concentrated ice crystals is a recently identified problem and 
occurs with alarmingly high frequency worldwide. This counterintuitive and complex phenomenon has 
produced numerous calls for research to better understand and effectively address engine icing. The 
complex aerothermodynamic processes that permit ice to accrete inside the core of an engine in flight are 
not understood to a level that allows for effective analysis and prevention or mitigation techniques to be 
employed with confidence. Therefore, the AEST Project is planning to invest its engine-icing resources in 
HIWC icing research. 
Evidence indicates that engine icing incidents caused by ice accreting inside the core of turbojet 
engines have been occurring for more than two decades. Since the early 1980s, studies of worldwide 
aircraft engine incidents have identified over 140 engine power loss events caused by engine core icing 
(Ref. 13). These events include compressor surge and stall, combustor flameout, engine rollback, and 
engine damage during and after flight in high ice water content (HIWC) conditions. Both commuter and 
large transport airplanes were involved. Project level milestone AEST3.1.01 is aimed at developing a 
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suite of enhanced icing instruments to withstand the particularly harsh HIWC environments to 
characterize the atmospheric environment associated with engine icing power loss events.  
Research will attempt to determine which environmental conditions can lead to engine core icing; the 
location inside the engine where it will occur; and how much ice will accrete. Additionally, NASA 
intends to conduct a flight campaign using a specially instrumented research aircraft to characterize 
natural HIWC environments. Advanced radar enhancement research efforts and post-flight analyses will 
focus on discovering a signature for HIWC conditions; providing data for icing researchers that 
characterizes HIWC conditions; and evaluating designs and making performance estimates for future 
commercial detection systems. 
The NRC (Ref. 8) has indicated the need for better analytical models to predict adverse weather (e.g., 
rain, ice, hail, and crosswinds) impact on fans, compressors, and combustor stability. These models 
should be physics-based and validated with experimental data. Detailed weather data, as a function of 
altitude, are needed for altitudes up to 20,000 ft. Data on water concentration and droplet size are 
especially important. Analyses of the impact of ingested freezing rain and ice as they traverse the 
propulsion system need to be improved. Better models will lead to more robust engine designs and 
improved operational procedures.  
A significant segment of TC1, engine icing characterization and simulation capability, is focused on 
development and application of advanced numerical simulation codes to address the engine core icing 
hazard. Three key AEST Level 2 milestones are planned to target engine icing simulation capability. 
Milestone AEST3.2.02 will develop a tool to generate compression system performance maps with 
assumed simulated and computed blockage effects caused by ice crystal engine icing for use in an engine 
system modeling code. Milestone AEST3.2.04 will develop a tool to calculate mixed-phase ice accretion 
on engine components and assess the sensitivity of an engine to mixed-phase icing. The tool will predict 
ice accretion rates and locations by comparing the calculated results with results from engine icing 
laboratory tests. Finally, milestone AEST3.2.05 will produce an engine icing validation test to assess the 
Propulsion Systems Laboratory (PSL) icing test cell capability at the NASA Glenn Research Center and 
to simulate an engine icing event. 
6.3 Loss of Control in Flight 
LOC in flight involves accidents that occur during airborne phases of flight where aircraft control is 
lost. LOC can occur during either IMC or visual meteorological conditions. LOC in flight may be caused 
by a stall, an icing-related event, a severe atmospheric turbulence or wake vortex encounter, or a flight-
critical system or component malfunction or failure. Aircraft energy management systems (excessive 
airspeed, altitude, and rate of descent) and aircraft configuration (flaps, slats, speed brakes, and onboard 
systems) can also result in LOC accidents or incidents. Analyses of NTSB accident and FAA incident 
data established that both powerplant and nonpowerplant system or component failures and malfunctions 
are significant contributing factors to aviation safety risk (Ref. 14).  
The National Aeronautics Research and Development Plan states that research is needed to facilitate 
implementation of advanced systems logic and architectures to avoid, detect, and resolve upset conditions 
that can lead to loss of stability and maneuverability caused by hazardous convective environments or 
icing (Ref. 15). HIWC atmospheric conditions capable of causing ice accretion on vital aircraft sensors 
and inside jet engines are representative of the types of hazardous weather environments that are potential 
contributors to upset conditions that can lead to LOC accidents or incidents. 
Portions of the AEST project are addressing icing-related events and powerplant system failures and 
malfunctions as causal factors in LOC accidents through current work on airframe and engine icing. 
Research conducted under TC2 will increase flight safety in icing conditions by introducing validated and 
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accepted icing simulation tools earlier in the design cycle. Reliable assessments and effective mitigation 
design approaches will be provided, and technology to enable safe flight operations in SLD environments 
will be developed. 
TC1 focuses on developing engine core icing simulation tools and techniques to predict ice accretion 
inside engines. Research will determine the environmental conditions in which icing can occur, the 
location inside the engine where it will occur, and how much ice will accrete. Another key component or 
research element of TC1 is the development of automatic engine control methods to mitigate the effects 
of, or prevent engine core icing altogether. The ultimate goal—reducing engine core icing events—
depends on discovering how it occurs and affects engine operation, as well as finding effective means to 
prevent it. A sophisticated engine simulation and control methodology was developed, validated, and 
verified under the NASA AvSP’s Integrated Resilient Aircraft Control project called Vehicle Systems 
Safety Technology (VSST). The AEST and VSST projects are working to capitalize on this technology 
by applying it to this TC. 
Finally, one of the objectives of TC3 is to develop mature technologies to remotely sense and 
measure icing conditions, and to provide real-time information to the pilot and operators in the NAS. This 
will provide aircraft with a greater ability to avoid the hazards of icing, convective weather, and wake 
vortices that are precursors to LOC accidents and incidents. The icing weather systems development 
element of TC3 includes research activities that will expand detection and measurement capabilities for 
inflight icing hazards for long-term adoption in the NextGen airspace system. Research will focus on 
mapping ground-based and airborne remote sensing of meteorological conditions that are conducive to in-
flight icing hazards. In addition, the advanced radar enhancements element will support development of 
hazard characterization studies for aircraft engine and airframe icing conditions and aircraft wake vortex 
investigation and modeling. The need for icing remote sensing technologies has long been recognized 
within NASA, and an FAA-sponsored international review of in-flight icing issues concluded that remote 
sensing could be useful in avoiding severe icing conditions by all aircraft (Refs. 16 and 17).  
6.4 Runway Safety 
Runway safety encompasses runway incursions, excursions, and confusion (takeoffs and landings on 
wrong runways or taxiways). The number of runway and taxiway incursions remains unacceptably high 
despite recent efforts to minimize their occurrence. Runway incursions are expected to remain as a critical 
safety risk in the future. Flight deck workload and distractions preflight are contributing factors. The 
NTSB considers runway incursions one of its top three aviation safety issues, noting that “these incidents 
continue to occur with alarming, and increased, frequency” (Ref. 12). Implementing the NTSB’s 
recommended safety system for ground movement will ensure the safe movement of airplanes on the 
ground and provide immediate warnings of probable collisions and incursions directly to flight crews in 
the cockpit. 
The Flight Safety Foundation conducted the Runway Safety Initiative (RSI) to address safety 
concerns and events involving runway incursions, excursions, and confusion. The RSI project team 
consisted of about 20 representatives from worldwide organizations, including operators, manufacturers, 
air navigation service providers, pilot groups, and other industry associations. After reviewing all these 
areas, the RSI team focused primarily on reducing runway excursion risks since 97 percent of runway 
accidents were found to have been caused by excursions (Ref. 18). The team also pointed out that runway 
incursion and confusion interventions would be useful to improve runway safety, including moving map 
displays and vision enhancement technologies. In the NextGen Integrated Work Plan (IWP), the Joint 
Planning and Development Office outlined a set of research and development activities that are required 
to support the proposed NextGen operational concepts (Ref. 19). Key activities identified in the IWP were 
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applied research and development of low visibility and surface operations technologies to increase 
operator situational awareness in poor visibility terminal and airport surface conditions. 
Higher numbers of aircraft in the system increases air and ground aircraft density. To address this 
increased demand, research needs to develop systems that improve pilot and controller awareness of 
airport surface conditions (aircraft and ground vehicle locations, runway occupancy, and pavement 
conditions), particularly in low visibility situations. Improving flight crew and ground controller 
situational awareness is critical to reducing incidents and accidents on the ground (Ref. 15). 
Poor visibility conditions are also a significant contributing factor to runway and taxiway surface 
incidents. AEST research is addressing runway safety through the smart visual awareness element of 
TC3. Level 2 milestones AEST4.2.14 and AEST4.2.15 plan to complete both a laboratory and flight 
demonstration of a real-time testbed of a basic pattern recognition engine for enhanced vision. These 
demonstrations are the culmination of the development of the pattern-recognition engine known as the 
streamlined spatial vision tree. The resulting smart avionics imaging sensor is a compact flight test unit 
that uses both image enhancement and pattern recognition. The research focuses on the low-visibility 
hazard and on terrain detection, as well as takeoff, landing, and taxiing hazards in poor visibility 
conditions. Moreover, Laser Imaging Through Obscurants, an active imaging system, and Forward-
Looking Interferometry, a hyperspectral passive imaging system, are both being pursued under the AEST 
Project to enable equivalent VFR operations under low visibility conditions. 
6.5 Super Density Operations 
Expected growth in the demand for air transportation will require more efficient and dense en route 
and terminal area operations. New procedures will be needed to reduce minimum spacing requirements 
during all phases of flight and in all weather conditions, through an integrated approach that leverages a 
suite of emerging technologies such as performance-based navigation and automatic dependent 
surveillance broadcast. Performance-based navigation procedures such as required navigation 
performance, area navigation, optimized profile descents, and tailored arrivals for oceanic flights, are 
being developed to increase the capacity and efficiency of the NAS, as well as provide environmental 
benefits such as reductions in fuel emissions and aircraft noise.  
Higher levels of air traffic will require simultaneous arrival procedures at airports with closely spaced 
parallel runways to achieve the capacity and efficiency gains needed in the NextGen environment. 
NextGen Operational Improvements 0400 and 0401 specify wake turbulence mitigation procedures for 
departures and arrivals to allow more closely spaced arrival and departure operations to maintain airport 
and runway capacity (Ref. 19). The National Aeronautics Research and Development Plan states that 
“reduced aircraft separation will require a move to trajectory-based operations, performance-based 
navigation, and a new allocation of responsibilities between air and ground and between humans and 
automation. In addition, planned advanced airspace design concepts that can be dynamically adjusted to 
meet demand requirements and avoid hazardous weather conditions must be developed with safety in 
mind.” (Ref. 15). 
The introduction of increased operational complexity and new technologies in the NextGen will likely 
give rise to unanticipated consequences that could reduce the safety profile of aircraft and the NAS. 
Atmospheric hazard information presented to flight deck crews is currently limited and must be improved 
to provide greater safety, especially as NextGen operations evolve. Thus, there is a significant need for 
increased atmospheric hazard detection, information collection, and mitigation capabilities. A remote 
sensing capability does not currently exist on aircraft to detect CAT, wake vortex, icing conditions, and 
ice-crystals, or to see through low-visibility aircraft environments. Current atmospheric hazard sensing, 
lightning sensing, and mitigation deficiencies have been confirmed by several independent studies and 
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aviation community feedback. The FAA’s NextGen Reduce Weather Impact solution set supports 
integration of a broad range of weather information into air traffic decisionmaking and the 
implementation of remote atmospheric hazard sensor technologies to mitigate the effects of weather 
resulting in safer operations in the NAS (Ref. 20). Also, several published reports including the “Decadal 
Survey of Civil Aeronautics,” confirm the need for continued remote sensing research and development. 
In this report the NRC calls for improved onboard weather systems and tools to minimize the impact of 
weather on the control of flight in heavy traffic. The report identifies affordable new sensors, system 
technologies, and procedures to improve wake turbulence prediction and measurement as an important 
research technology and challenge. It states, “Existing wake vortex separation standards reduce system 
capacity during takeoff and landing operations and instrument approaches. Research by the FAA and 
NASA has been focused on procedural enhancements that take advantage of wake transport by winds. 
However, the relaxation of in-trail wake separation standards awaits improved measurement and 
prediction of wake behavior. Existing sensors and models do not adequately characterize wake decay 
phenomena, especially at typical final approach altitudes. Improved sensors, including coherent pulsed 
lidars, capable of directly measuring wake rotational momentum, are needed to support phenomenological 
studies and enable more accurate predictions of wake magnitude and decay in various atmospheric 
conditions. Those predictions, combined with models of aircraft upset risk, should allow reduced wake 
separation standards without degrading safety” (Ref. 8). 
AEST research activity that addresses TC3 will enable pilots and controllers to obtain real-time 
accurate information on a broad range of atmospheric hazards, including CAT, wake vortex, icing, ice 
crystals, and low visibility aircraft environments. Research will be conducted to develop advanced 
airborne radar technology for safety applications such as windshear detection and enhanced turbulence 
detection. Milestone AEST 4.2.12 will result in ground-based testing and verification of a new fiber 
optics-based lidar system that will be used to detect kinetic air hazards (e.g., turbulence, wake vortices, 
and windshear) on commercial transport and business jet aircraft. In addition, two key TC3 Level 3 
milestones are focused on: (1) a forward-looking interferometer field test for wake vortex hazard 
observation (AEST 4.3.05) and (2) characterization of wake vortex hazards in terminal area and en route 
airspace to provide models and hazard signatures for sensor algorithm development and validation (AEST 
4.3.09).  
7.0 Discussion and Conclusion 
7.1 National Transportation Safety Board Accident Data 
The NTSB accident data was analyzed to identify trends related to the AEST Project TCs. Four types 
of NTSB operational accident data were examined across four time periods (1989 to 2008): Parts 121, 
135–S, 135–NS, and 91. The specific accidents types were engine icing related to ice crystals (TC1), 
icing/freezing rain/drizzle (TC2), and turbulence, wake vortex, lightning, low visibility, and low lighting 
(TC3).  
TC1’s focus is the characterization and simulation capability related to ice-crystal icing. A search of 
the NTSB accident data set did not yield accidents related to propulsion systems that were impacted by 
ice crystals and less than 5 percent of all accidents were affected by icing conditions (TC2). When icing 
was involved in Part 91 and 135–S operations, however, between 25 and 54 percent involved fatalities. 
Turbulence (excluding terrain-induced and wake vortex) was a cause or factor in 24 percent of Part 
121 accidents compared with less than 1 percent of accidents in other flight operations. Less than 
3 percent of fatal accidents and fatalities, regardless of flight operation, were affected by turbulence. 
Turbulence accidents usually did not involve any fatalities. Turbulence-related accident rates have 
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declined over time for Parts 91 and 135–NS, while the accident rate for Part 121 has fluctuated over time. 
CAT was involved in 19 percent of all turbulence accidents. In general, less than 1 percent of all accidents 
involved wake vortex and have decreased over time, except for Part 91 operations. Although the accident 
rate related to wake vortex has been low and decreasing during this study, expected growth in the demand 
for air transportation will require more dense en route and terminal area operations resulting in the need 
for wake vortex mitigation.  
Lightning was a cause or factor in less than 1 percent of all accidents. With the exception of Part 135–
NS, the rate of lightning incidents has remained fairly constant over time. Even though the rate is low, 
there is concern that future aircraft, with more composite structures, will be more impacted by lightning.  
Low visibility/lighting was involved in 6 to 23 percent of all accidents depending on operational 
category. While only 10 percent of Part 91 operations involved low visibility/lighting, 60 percent of these 
involved fatalities. Generally, the rates of low visibility/lighting accidents have been declining over time, 
except for Part 121 operations where the rate has remained steady. Most low visibility/lighting accidents 
involved low lighting.  
All icing, turbulence, wake vortex, lightning, low visibility, and low lighting accidents combined 
(account for nearly one-third of all accidents. The lowest percentage of accidents affected by any of these 
atmospheric conditions was in Part 91, yet 58 percent involved fatalities. The combined rate of accidents 
for all atmospheric conditions declined for Parts 91 and 135–NS, increased for Part 135–S, and remained 
steady for Part 121 operations. 
7.2 Federal Aviation Administration Incident Data 
The FAA’s Accident/Incident database was analyzed to identify trends related to the AEST Project 
TCs. Four types of FAA operational incident data were examined across four time periods (1989 to 
2006): Parts 121, 135–S, 135–NS, and Part 91. The specific incident types were engine icing related to ice 
crystals (TC1), icing/freezing rain/drizzle (TC2), and turbulence, wake vortex, lightning, low visibility, 
and low lighting (TC3).  
TC1’s focus is the characterization and simulation capability related to ice crystal icing. A search of 
the FAA database set yielded 38 incidents related to propulsion system failures. Of those, 14 were caused 
by engine icing; two specifically cited ice crystals in the propulsion system as a cause for engine 
flameout. Most of the engine icing incidents occurred during Part 121 operations. The incidents were 
often not thoroughly investigated; the report giving little information as to the cause of the engine issues. 
Less than 2 percent of incidents were affected by airframe icing. Reported icing-related incidents 
declined during this study, except for Part 135–S operations. 
Turbulence caused less than 3 percent of incidents in the FAA incident database, and the rates 
declined during this study. CAT was found in only 3 percent of the turbulence-related accidents. Wake 
vortex and lightning were each involved in less than 1 percent of the reported incidents and the rate of 
these types of incidents has declined over time as well. Low visibility/lighting was a factor in 27 percent 
of the incidents and declined during the study. Part 135 operations were most affected by low 
visibility/lighting conditions.  
Close to one-third of all incidents in Part 121s and 135 operations were affected by one or more of the 
six atmospheric conditions reviewed in this study (icing, turbulence, wake vortex, lightning, low lighting, 
and low visibility).  
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7.3 Future Safety Risk 
A summary of the evaluation of research in the three TC areas’ projected impacts on critical future 
safety risk areas is provided in Table 18 showing how each research area maps to the critical future safety 
risk areas.  
An evaluation of the AEST Project research and technology development activities against several 
critical areas of future safety risk in the air transportation system was completed. These high-level 
qualitative future safety challenges were identified from multiple literature sources and are documented in 
the Systems Analysis of NASA AvSP—Final Report (Ref. 7). As stated in the AEST Project Plan 
(Ref. 1), the AvSP, including the AEST project, will “identify and develop tools, methods, and 
technologies for improving overall aircraft safety of new and legacy vehicles operating in the Next 
Generation Air Transportation System.” More specifically, the AEST Project will investigate sources of 
risk and provide needed technology to ensure safe flight in, and around atmospheric hazards. 
The focus of AEST research is on in-flight icing, both engine and airframe, as well as investigating 
other high-priority atmospheric hazards and sensor technologies required for their detection. These 
include wake vortex encounters, convective weather, turbulence, reduced visibility conditions, and 
lightning. The research is relevant to the safety needs of the aviation community and is crucial to the 
mitigation of future aviation safety risks associated with icing and atmospheric hazards for several 
reasons. First, icing is still a safety concern across all categories of subsonic aircraft and engine icing 
incidents are occurring on a frequent basis with the aviation community calling for action. Secondly, new 
aviation regulatory requirements necessitate development of new and enhanced icing simulation tools. 
Finally, operations in the NextGen environment will demand precise information about the atmosphere 
and awareness of weather hazards. 
The engine icing characterization and simulation capability (TC1) will explicitly address the future 
safety risk area of icing/ice detection through its emphasis on developing analytical methods and both 
computational and experimental simulation tools to prevent ice crystal icing that can cause turbofan 
engine interruptions and failures. It will also target engine icing-related events as causal factors that can 
lead to in-flight LOC accidents and incidents. 
 
 
TABLE 18.—PROJECTED IMPACT OF AEST TECHNICAL CHALLENGE (TC) 
RESEARCH ON CRITICAL FUTURE SAFETY RISK AREAS 
Critical future safety risk areas TC areas 
TC1 engine 
icing 
TC2 airframe 
icing 
TC3 AHSMa 
Aircraft mixed fleet equipage    
Approach and landing accident reduction    
Enhanced survivability in the event of an accident    
Human fatigue    
Icing/ice detection    
Inadequate protection, analysis, and dissemination of safety data    
Increasing complexity and reliance on automation    
Loss of control—in flight    
Runway safety    
Super density operations    
aAtmospheric hazard sensing and mitigation 
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The airframe icing simulation and engineering tool capability (TC2) will develop and demonstrate the 
capability to simulate and model airframe ice accretion and related aerodynamic performance degradation 
for current and future aircraft configurations over an expanded range of icing conditions. In addition, this 
research will have a positive impact on solving the problem of icing effects that can lead to LOC and 
approach and landing accidents by disrupting the aircraft’s aerodynamic lift characteristics.  
Research carried out under the AHSM technology capability (TC3) will address several areas of 
future aviation safety risk. The major focus of this TC is to develop advanced technologies for sensing 
and measurement of icing, turbulence, and wake vortex hazards for real-time information in the cockpit 
and throughout the NAS. As a result, risks associated with icing and ice detection, LOC in flight, and 
approach and landing accidents will be reduced. In addition, research to develop new technologies for 
enhanced vision systems and advanced imaging sensors will enable automatic detection of aviation safety 
hazards, in particular runway, terrain, and midair collisions during poor visibility flight conditions. This 
smart visual awareness research will bring about safer runway operations and improvements in safety as 
capacity increases in the NextGen environment. Finally, Super Density Operations, a foundational 
NextGen capability, will significantly increase the capacity in the NAS in response to the projected 
growth in demand. Enabling technologies required to achieve this NextGen operational concept are 
defined in the NextGen IWP (Ref. 20), and include wake vortex advisory systems to mitigate inadvertent 
wake turbulence encounters; enhanced onboard vision systems to allow VFR operations in low visibility 
conditions; and onboard turbulence mitigation systems to allow aircraft to safely travel through greater 
intensities of adverse weather. Research in this TC will produce technological advances in all of these 
areas, and allow for a safe reduction in the longitudinal and lateral spacing requirements needed in the 
super density environment. 
References 
1. R&T Portfolio Project Plan. Atmospheric Environment Safety Technologies (AEST) Project Plan, 
Draft Version 5.0, NASA, Oct. 1, 2011. 
2. https://asafe.larc.nasa.gov/DOC/definitions.html 
3. Code of Federal Regulations: Aeronautics and Space. 14 CFR: Office of the Federal Register 
National Archives and Records Administration, Washington, DC, 2004. 
4. National Transportation Safety Board: U.S. Air Carrier Operations Calendar Year 1999, Annual 
Review of Aircraft Accident Data. NTSB/ARC‒02/03, PB2002‒109241, 2003. 
5. National Transportation Safety Board: Government Information Locator Service (GILS): Aviation 
Accident Synopses. 2002.  http://ntsb.gov/Info/gils/gilssyn.htm Accessed Jan. 14, 2013. 
6. National Aviation Weather Program Council: FAA Service Areas: Ceiling and Visibility. Ch. 3, p. 3‒1. 
7. Jones, Sharon Monica, et al.: Systems Analysis of NASA Aviation Safety Program—Final Report. 
2010.  
8. Decadal Survey of Civil Aeronautics: National Research Council, 2006 
9. Ishimaru, K.: Ice Protection Harmonization Working Group (IPHWG) Icing Rulemaking 
Recommendations. Presentation to Joint Implementation Measurement and Data Analysis Team, 
Federal Aviation Administration, July 8, 2009. 
10. Federal Aviation Administration: Activation of Ice Protection: Final Rule. Federal Register, vol. 76, 
no. 162, Docket No. FAA–2009–0675, Amendment No. 121‒356, 2011. 
11. Commercial Aviation Safety Team: Safety Enhancements. Joint Implementation Measurement Data 
Analysis Team (JIMDAT) Meetings and Aviation Safety Information Analysis and Sharing (ASIAS) 
System, Directed Studies, 2011.  
12. National Transportation Safety Board: Most Wanted Aviation Safety Improvements, 2010. 
http://www.ntsb.gov/safety/mwl.html Accessed Jan. 14, 2013. 
NASA/TM—2014-217729 33 
13. Mason, Jeanne G.; Strapp, J. Walter; and Chow, Philip: The Ice Particle Threat to Engines in Flight. 
AIAA 2006‒206, 2006. 
14. Reveley, Mary S., et al.: Commercial Aircraft Integrated Vehicle Health Management Study. 
NASA/TM—2010-215808, 2010. http://ntrs.nasa.gov/ 
15. National Aeronautics Research and Development Plan, Biennial Update, National Science and 
Technology Council, Feb. 2010. 
16. Reehorst, Andrew, et al.: Progress Towards the Remote Sensing of Aircraft Icing Hazards. 
NASA/TM—2009-215828, 2010. http://ntrs.nasa.gov/ 
17. Mead, James B.; Pazmany, Andrew; and Goodberlet, Mark: Evaluation of Technologies for the 
Design of a Prototype In-Flight Remote Aircraft Icing Potential Detection System. DOT/FAA/AR‒
98/72, 1998. 
18. Flight Safety Foundation Safety Initiatives, 2010. 
19. Joint Planning and Development Office: Next Generation Air Transportation System Integrated Work 
Plan: A Functional Outline. Version 1.0, Sept. 30, 2008. 
20. Federal Aviation Administration: NextGen Implementation Plan. March 2010 
 
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form ApprovedOMB No. 0704-0188
The public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and
maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including
suggestions for reducing this burden, to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite
1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it
does not display a currently valid OMB control number.
PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.
1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY)
01-09-2014
2. REPORT TYPE
Technical Memorandum
3. DATES COVERED (From - To)
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE
Aviation Trends Related to Atmospheric Environment Safety Technologies Project
Technical Challenges
5a. CONTRACT NUMBER
5b. GRANT NUMBER
5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER
6. AUTHOR(S)
Reveley, Mary, S.; Withrow, Colleen, A.; Barr, Lawrence, C.; Evans, Joni, K.; Leone,
Karen, M.; Jones, Sharon, M.
5d. PROJECT NUMBER
5e. TASK NUMBER
5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER
WBS 648987.02.01.03.40
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
John H. Glenn Research Center at Lewis Field
Cleveland, Ohio 44135-3191
8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION
    REPORT NUMBER
E-18441
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Washington, DC 20546-0001
10. SPONSORING/MONITOR'S
      ACRONYM(S)
NASA
11. SPONSORING/MONITORING
      REPORT NUMBER
NASA/TM-2014-217729
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
Unclassified-Unlimited
Subject Category: 03
Available electronically at http://www.sti.nasa.gov
This publication is available from the NASA Center for AeroSpace Information, 443-757-5802
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES
14. ABSTRACT
Current and future aviation safety trends related to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s Atmospheric Environment Safety
Technologies Project’s three technical challenges (engine icing characterization and simulation capability; airframe icing simulation and
engineering tool capability; and atmospheric hazard sensing and mitigation technology capability) were assessed by examining the National
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) accident database (1989 to 2008), incidents from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
accident/incident database (1989 to 2006), and literature from various industry and government sources. The accident and incident data were
examined for events involving fixed-wing airplanes operating under Federal Aviation Regulation (FAR) Parts 121, 135, and 91 for
atmospheric conditions related to airframe icing, ice-crystal engine icing, turbulence, clear air turbulence, wake vortex, lightning, and low
visibility (fog, low ceiling, clouds, precipitation, and low lighting). Five future aviation safety risk areas associated with the three AEST
technical challenges were identified after an exhaustive survey of a variety of sources and include: approach and landing accident reduction,
icing/ice detection, loss of control in flight, super density operations, and runway safety.
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